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Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington: As 
Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 
Should Ordinances and Injunctions be 
Reviewed Under the Madsen and Frisby 
Standards of Review by Using a De 
Novo Standard or a "Clearly 
Erroneous" Standard?* 
In Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, the Sixth Circuit used 
a de novo scope of review and applied the new intermediate 
standard of review, developed by the Supreme Court in Madsen v. 
Women's Health Center, Inc., for content-neutral limits to methods 
of protest. The author argues that appellate courts may narrow 
their scope of review without risking any "chilling effect" on the 
First Amendment. The dangers of systematic bias in state courts 
that drove the Supreme Court to de novo review in civil rights and 
First Amendment cases in the 1960s no longer exist. Furthermore, 
judicial deference in these kinds of cases may be justified because 
the antiabortion movement still has access to the political process, 
the lack of which is a necessary precursor to any civil disobedience 
in a just society, as defined by John Rawls in Theory of Justice. 
Given a narrowed scope of review, the Sixth Circuit should have 
remanded the case back to the district court for resolution under the 
Madsen standard of review where the court could have developed 
a more complete record with which to support-or modify-its 
findings. 
• I would like to thank Professor Charles Wiggins for his insight and support. 
I dedicate this Note to my wife, Pat. Without her, IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The nature of a woman's right to a choice concerning access to 
abortion may be the most divisive social issue of our time. Juxtaposing 
the competing issues of free speech and protest on one hand, and the 
right of targets of that protest to be left alone on the other, onto the 
abortion debate merely adds fuel to the fire. Over the last decade, parts 
of the pro-life movement, increasingly frustrated by a lack of progress 
within the legislatures and the courts, 1 have taken to public protest. 
Some groups, such as Operation Rescue, have targeted for extended 
blockade specific clinics offering abortions.2 Groups have also targeted 
the homes of doctors and other abortion providers. Violence, all of it 
apparently stemming from elements within the pro-life movement, has 
flared. 3 In response, many of these targeted clinics and doctors filed for 
injunctive relief.4 In addition, local and state legislative bodies have 
enacted ordinances to help control, and in some cases outright ban, 
protests in residential areas.5 Inevitably, litigation ensued that has 
I. Joseph Sobran, The Only Option Left? Paul Hill's Dilemma Led Him to a 
Violent Act, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 4, 1994, at 13A. In this article, the author 
comments on the disenfranchisement felt by many pro-life activists in the wake of the 
I 992 Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (I 992): 
[I]n 1992, came the day the pro-lifers had worked and waited for. And they 
got the reward of Sisyphus. The court, almost all Republican appointees by 
now, reaffirmed its arbitrary ruling in Roe, not on grounds that it was 
constitutionally sound, but for the frank reason that the court's own prestige 
was at stake. . . . This meant that the pro-life movement could achieve 
nothing through the political process. 
Sobran, supra. 
2. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Limit On Protests at Abortion Clinic Reaches Top 
Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1994, at Al3 (reporting that protests at a Melbourne, 
Florida health clinic continued even while litigaton enused about injunctions against 
certain types of protest. This litigation would later culminate in Madsen v. Women's 
Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); see infra analysis of Madsen in text accompanying 
notes 105-33). 
3. Laurie Goodstein & Pierre Thomas, Clinic Killings Follow Years of 
Antiabortion Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, I 995, at Al. The article quoted a 
spokesperson from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms who stated that, of the 
49 people prosecuted by the agency so far, "We found that all expressed antiabortion 
views. There is nothing in our cases that would show it's providers or supporters of 
abortion that are doing these acts." Id. at A8. 
4. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. For a typical state court action, see Murray v. Lawson, 649 
A.2d 1253 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2264 (1995). 
5. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1987). For analysis of this case, see 
infra text accompanying notes 92-104. 
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resulted in at least four major Supreme Court decisions in this area since 
1987, three of them in the last two years.6 
The stakes are very high. The antiabortion picketing cases mark the 
first time in decades that the Court has systematically sanctioned limits 
on the right to protest and dissent. 7 The ferocity of protests and the 
increasing incidents of violence on one side,8 and the privacy rights of 
targeted parties on the other,9 may well force a critical re-examination 
of the role of protest and dissent in American society on a scale 
6. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488 (constitutionality of ordinance upheld in response to 
a facial challenge); Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 (new standard of review for content-
neutral injunctions against targeted protests); Bray, 506 U.S. at 263 (1993). In Bray, the 
Court held that women seeking abortions are not a class within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985, thus, eliminating a major method for obtaining federal jurisdiction. Id. at 266-
74. This problem of obtaining federal jurisdiction has since been seemingly rectified by 
passage of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act of I 994. However, 
pro-life organizations have challenged the constitutionality of FACE and won in one 
district court. But, the case was subsequently overturned, and similar suits have been 
lost in six other district courts and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. For further 
discussion of cases involving the constitutionality of FACE, see infra note 253. For 
another cause of action that abortion rights advocacy groups have used to try to curb 
antiabortion protest, see National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 
(1994) (allowing potential use of Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
Act in suing antiabortion protesters for damage to clinics). 
7. The Red Scare cases of the 1920s and the I 950s contrast sharply with the 
Court's approach today. But, in any comparison in this area, one must keep in mind that 
because of the development of the First Amendment during the course of the twentieth 
century, the Red Scare cases were decided on very different grounds. See, e.g., Schenck 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech 
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."); 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (the Smith Act, which prohibited 
conspiracy to organize certain groups such as the Communist Party, was upheld as 
constitutional based upon the application of the "clear and present danger" test to the 
means used to control speech advocating the violent overthrow of the government). In 
the I 960s, the Court generally expanded the right to protest. For a discussion of the 
distinction between the approaches of the two eras, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARYL. REV. 189 (1983). 
8. See, e.g., Goodstein & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al ("Militant antiabortion 
activists have been waging a protracted campaign of violence against women's health 
clinics and the people who work in them over the past decade, creating a climate of 
terror Jong before a gunman opened fire last month at clinics in Massachusetts and 
Virginia."). 
9. For a detailed examination of the support for that right to privacy, see, for 
example, Joy H. McMurtry & Patti S. Pennock, Ending The Violence: Applying the Ku 
Klux Klan Act, RICO, and FACE to the Abortion Controversy, 30 LAND & WATER L. 
REV. 203 (I 995). 
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unprecedented smce the civil rights and antiwar protest days of the 
l 960s. 10 
The Court, in Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., established 
standards for the lower courts to use in fashioning content-neutral limits 
to methods of protest. 11 Honoring these limits may do much to prevent 
our social fabric from tearing further than it has to date12 by acting as 
a deterrent to future violence and social unrest. To do so meaningfully, 
the lower courts must administer these limits with fairness and certain-
ty.13 At this point in the struggle over abortion, the courts are acting 
much like a referee in a prizefight where the boxers are locked up with 
each other. The risk of illegal blows and "rabbit punches" runs high. 
The referee must separate the fighters. The courts, to act as effective 
referees, must have the tools and the ability to apply them with timely 
certainty. 
Appellate courts can potentially play a significant role by assisting the 
trial courts in their role. They can help ensure that enforcement is more 
timely by limiting the scope of their review of injunctions that are issued 
by federal district court judges to restrain violent protest. Traditionally, 
the Supreme Court has conducted an "independent review" of First 
Amendment cases; ostensibly to avoid the risk of a "chilling effect" on 
free speech. 14 But, that "chilling effect" is minimized in cases where 
federal court judges properly invoke content-neutral injunctions to curb 
disruptive or violent protests. Thus, appellate courts may be able to 
routinely apply a "clearly erroneous" standard or an "abuse of discre-
tion" standard and greatly speed up the enforcement of injunctions. 15 
l 0. Signs abound that this debate is already underway. On the side of limits, see 
id. For warnings of the dangers of limits, see Richard Stith, A Pro-Life Strategy, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 2, I 994, at A31 (interpreting Madsen as enjoining sidewalk counselling, 
which cuts off pro-lifers' hopes to work within the system nonviolently); Bruce 
Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 67 (1990). 
11. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). See infra text accompanying notes 105-33. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 205-31 for discussion of John Rawls's 
theory that in a reasonably just society, one's duty to obey the law may well override 
one's right to resist injustice, when, under certain conditions, the two conflict. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 232-40. 
14. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 51 l 
(1984). Yet, the Court also commented that "[t]he requirement that special deference 
be given to a trial judge's credibility determinations is itself a recognition of the broader 
proposition that the presumption of correctness that attaches to factual findings is 
stronger in some cases than in others." Id. at 500. See infra text accompanying notes 
43-55. 
15. Evan Lee concludes that appellate courts should apply a "clearly erroneous" 
standard to the review of mixed questions of law and fact in those cases where it is not 
creating "meaningful precedent." See Evan T. Lee, Principled Decision Making and the 
Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. 
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A number of factors mitigate the risk of a "chilling effect"16 in this 
area: the now relatively settled state of the case law; 17 the passage of 
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act of 1994,18 
which guarantees federal jurisdiction; and a lack of systemic bias against 
one class of parties versus others within the federal court system.19 
The context for this proposed reduction in the scope of appellate review 
is Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, a case recently decided by the 
Sixth Circuit that overturned an ordinance banning residential picket-
ing.20 The court used the new Madsen standard of review and lifted 
the district court's preliminary injunction, which regulated protests 
targeted at clinics and individuals.21 Rather than aggressively review-
ing cases in the manner that the Sixth Circuit did in Vittitow, appellate 
courts may, in the wake of Madsen, allow the district courts to manage 
enforcement with less interference. This policy would make enforce-
ment more certain and more equitable to all parties, contributing to the 
deterrent effect of the injunctions and working towards the ultimate goal 
REV. 235, 285 (1991). Lee defines "meaningful precedent" as "a decision that the 
appellate judge believes some future court will find to control the case before it." Id. 
at 285 n.276. As will be discussed, the relatively settled state of the case law in the 
wake of Madsen will decrease the probability that an appellate court will be forced to 
review every case de novo. See infra text accompanying notes 254-55. 
16. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 923 n.67 (1982) 
(overturning a Mississippi state court imposed injunction against a violence-tinged 
boycott that occurred in the context of desegregation in the 1960s). See infra text 
accompanying notes 183-95. 
17. The Court's decision in Frisby may have left the state of the law unsettled 
concerning enforcement of ordinances. However, the standard of review developed in 
Madsen may well have rectified that shortcoming. See infra text accompanying notes 
93-104. 
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West 1994). Based upon its commerce power, Congress 
enacted a law guaranteeing access to women's health clinics. In support of the Act, 
Congress made legislative findings that violence, threats of force, and physical 
obstructions aimed at persons seeking reproductive health services affected interstate 
commerce. The Act provides for criminal and civil penalties. Just as importantly, it 
also provides for a federal question cause of action for those seeking an injunction 
against demonstrators. However, pro-life organizations have attacked the Act's 
constitutionality, albeit unsuccessfully. See infra note 253. 
I 9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-85. Evan Lee advanced this proposition 
in support of his argument to limit the scope of appellate review in mixed questions 
cases where the appellate court is not creating meaningful precedent. See also Lee, 
supra note 15. 
20. 43 F.3d I 100 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2276 (1995). 
21. Id. at 1104. 
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of ameliorating a climate that is currently breeding increasing levels of 
violence. 
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW: THE PROBLEM OF ALLOCATION OF ROLES 
BETWEEN THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS 
The right to appeal in the United States is virtually universal.22 Yet, 
"[r]arely have commentators sought to justify why at least one appeal 
should be available in every case."23 The position of the American Bar 
Association's Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, 
which supports a standard mandating appeal of right, typifies the 
summary nature of the reasoning: "The right of appeal, while never held 
to be within the Due Process guaranty of the United States Constitution, 
is a fundamental element of procedural fairness as generally understood 
in this country."24 But, other reasons for appellate review may be 
found. 
In that regard, the appellate courts must, as their primary function, 
review the application of the rule oflaw made at the trial level for errors 
in the law used, the application of the law, or, under certain circumstanc-
es, the factual findings. 25 The distinction between fact and law has 
historically governed the intensity of that review.26 At the simplest 
level the trial court has authority over findings of fact because it has the 
"keener eye for the mien of an untruthful witness than do[es its] 
appellate siblings."27 The trier of fact has the opportunity to observe 
the demeanor of the witness, not merely review a written record. Also, 
the trial judge has considerable latitude in determining what evidence the 
trier of fact hears.28 
The appellate courts, by contrast, decide questions of pure law because 
they are "arguably ... in the best position to determine whether, where, 
22. Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 
YALE L.J. 62 (I 985). 
23. Id. at 66. 
24. Id. (quoting ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: 
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS§ 3.10, at 12 (1977)). 
25. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between 
the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury 
Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993 (1986). 
26. Id. at 993, 1000-02. 
27. Lee, supra note 15, at 260. 
28. The trial court has a superior vantage point for weighing evidence against 
witness credibility. Id. The trial court can also call witnesses itself, decide questions 
of relevance, authenticity, and a myriad other issues that the appellate court can only 
review. See generally FED. R. Evrn. 401, 403, 901-03; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES (2d ed. 1993). 
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when and how the law is in need of clarification or revision."29 The 
distinction of law and fact and the concomitantly differing roles of the 
two levels of courts represent only two arbitrary positions on a 
"continuum of experience"30 that meets in a muddied middle, suggest-
ing an ambivalence about who ought to make the primary decisions. At 
one extreme, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) allow 
appellate courts to overturn findings of fact only if they are "clearly 
erroneous."31 This 1985 addition to the Rules codified the long-held 
rule "that fact-finding is the special province of the trial level."32 The 
trial courts exercise discretionary power in fact-finding and application 
of the law to the facts "as defined by and within the limits set by 
law."33 The appellate courts reserve declaration of law to them-
selves.34 
The distinction between law and fact would appear to provide a nice 
dividing line between the two levels of courts.35 However, "the two 
categories have been used to describe at least three distinct functions: 
law declaration, fact identification, and law application."36 The trial 
court may perform all three at one point or another.37 The appellate 
29. Dalton, supra note 22, at 70-71. One excellent example is the redefinition of 
the law of defamation concerning public figures by the Supreme Court in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964). Louis, supra note 25, at IOI 7. 
30. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 
( 1985). 
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
32. Louis, supra note 25, at 994. 
33. Id. at 1017. 
34. Id. 
35. See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 235 (quoting H. HART & A. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 374-75 
(tentative ed. 1958)): 
Law declaration involves "formulating a proposition [that] affects not only the 
[immediate] case ... but all others that fall within its ternJs." ... 
Fact identification ... is a case-specific inquiry into what happened here. 
It is designed to yield only assertions that can be made without significantly 
implicating the governing legal principles. 
36. Id. at 234. 
37. See id. at 234-39. At least some law declaration must occur at the trial level 
because "[ q]uite obviously there are occasions when trial judges are acutely aware that 
the state of the law they are asked to apply is sorry." Dalton, supra note 22, at 71. Fact 
identification is the trial court's special province. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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court will operate in those areas as well, illustrating the difficulties 
attendant in deciding "what decisionmaker should decide the issue."38 
These allocative decisions, the "need for continuous development of 
constitutional principles on a case-by-case basis," and the "danger of 
systemic bias of other actors in the judicial system" come together in 
any analysis of the scope of review of the application of the law. 39 The 
scope has traditionally varied along a continuum from de novo review40 
to the "clearly erroneous" standard.41 It has been argued that in certain 
cases involving constitutional questions, de novo appellate review may 
be mandatory.42 
A. The New York Times Rule for the Appellate Scope of Review of 
First Amendment Cases 
The Supreme Court announced, in the landmark case of New York 
Times v. Sullivan, that independent appellate review was required to 
ensure that any judgment "does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on 
the field of free expression."43 The Court alluded to examination of 
mixed questions by saying that the Seventh Amendment's "ban on re-
examination of facts does not preclude us from determining whether 
governing rules of federal law have been properly applied to the 
facts."44 
The Court subsequently adopted the New York Times rule in a number 
of different First Amendment areas: obscenity,45 defamation,46 and 
38. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 237 ("Law application is a distinctive operation. 
The real issue is not analytic, but allocative .... "). 
39. Id. at 239. 
40. For a more complete discussion of constitutional facts, see id. at 229. See also 
Louis, supra note 25. 
41. See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 1045 (1980). For a full discussion of this case and others like it, see Lee, 
supra note 15, at 239. 
42. See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 246. Professor Monaghan ultimately rejects 
the assertion that de novo appellate review is mandatory, even in First Amendment 
cases, as an overly broad reading of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 
466 U.S. 485 (1984). He notes the "potentially burdensome character" and sense of 
overkill in avoiding a "chilling effect" of mandatory de novo review. Id. at 267-71. 
43. 376 U.S. 254,285 (1964) (overturning a libel award sustained by the Alabama 
Supreme Court. The trial court had found that a full page advertisement, in support of 
Martin Luther King when he was arrested in Birmingham, Alabama in connection with 
the civil rights protests there and containing insignificant factual errors was "libelous per 
se."). 
The motivation for this rule may be grounded elsewhere and may not be required. See 
infra text accompanying notes 56-85. See also Lee, supra note 15, at 283-84. 
44. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 n.26. 
45. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1972) ("First Amendment values 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by 
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civil rights boycotts.47 Each of these cases would appear to support 
across-the-board de novo review. The Court most clearly stated that 
proposition in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States.48 
In Bose, the Court accepted certiorari specifically to determine whether 
the appellate court's de novo review was warranted or should have been 
restricted to the "clearly erroneous" standard of FRCP 52(a).49 The 
Court did not restrict its affirmation of de novo review of First 
Amendment cases merely to defamation, but construed it broadly "in 
order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the 
Constitution."50 But, application of the concept of judicial duty to 
apply the standard remains unclear, even within First Amendment 
cases,51 let alone the myriad civil and criminal cases involving 
constitutional questions. 52 Henry Monaghan advanced the notion that 
appellate discretion in deciding whether to review a case de novo or to 
apply a more limited scope of review might well "rest on an unarticulat-
ed and undefended neo-Brandeisian premise: only 'personal' constitu-
tional rights, or some kinds of personal rights, warrant close appellate 
the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional 
claims when necessary."). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, I 00 
(1972). 
46. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 485. 
47. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). The Court held that 
nonviolent boycotts are protected by the First Amendment through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Only violent activity, which falls outside the 
protected status afforded by the First Amendment, may be so proscribed. Id. at 915-16 
n.50. The Court further reaffirmed its power to '"make an independent examination of 
the whole record."' Id. (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,235 (1963)). 
48. 466 U.S. at 501 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) "does not inhibit an appellate court's 
power to correct errors of law, including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding 
of law and fact."). 
49. Id. at 487. 
50. Id. at 511. 
51. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 246. 
52. Id. at 264-65. Monaghan cites Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983), as "an excellent ... example of limited review of 
constitutional law application. Over commerce and due process clause objections, the 
Court upheld application of a state tax to the income of a domestic corporation's foreign 
subsidiaries." Monaghan, supra note 30, at 265. In Container Corp., the Court said that 
"[i]t will do the cause of legal certainty little good if this Court turns every colorable 
claim that a state court erred in a particular application of ... principles into a de novo 
adjudication." Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 176. In a footnote, the Court added that 
"[t]his approach is, of course, quite different from the one we follow in certain other 
constitutional contexts." Id. at 176 n.13. As an example of the contrasting approach, 
the Court then cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Id. 
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scrutiny."53 Monaghan asked whether, in the wake of Bose, the Court 
may "properly limit its grant of review to whether correct first amend-
ment standards have been employed, leaving the 'routine' law applica-
tion point for final disposition in the court[s] below?"54 One answer 
to that question may lie in whether or not the appellate court views the 
state of the law as adequate or in need of further elaboration. Even if 
the law needs further elaboration, Monaghan argues that a discretionary, 
case-by-case approach may be best where appellate courts pick and 
choose the most suitable cases. 55 
B. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard Examined 
In a very different approach to the scope of appellate review, Evan 
Lee has argued that appellate courts should adopt the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact, and principled 
decision-making in de novo review of what the court will consider pure 
questions of law.56 Law and fact lie at two extremes of a continuum 
that reflects the allocation of decision-making authority between judges 
and juries or between appellate courts and trial courts.57 The Supreme 
Court has defined mixed questions as the application of undisputed law 
to established facts. 58 
Lee found that the circuit courts used four different models in 
adjudicating mixed questions: 59 ( 1) the "clearly erroneous" standard, 
practiced by the First and Seventh Circuits;60 (2) the de novo scope of 
53. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 265-66. This notion "reflects the specific 
substantive constitutional values at stake rather than generalized notions about the nature 
of federal judicial power." Id. at 259. 
54. Id. at 246. 
55. Id. at 274. Monaghan discusses the Court's approach in habeas corpus cases, 
where it has refused to go so far as to require de novo review of each case. Id. 
56. Lee, supra note 15, at 238 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 
287 (1982)). By contrast, mixed questions of law and fact are known as "questions of 
ultimate fact." Id. at 238 n.18. An "[u]ltimate fact is the 'legally determinative 
consideration ... which is or is not satisfied by subsidiary facts admitted or found by 
the trier of fact."' Id. at 238 (quoting Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 286). See also 
infra note 58. 
57. Lee, supra note 15, at 236. 
58. Id. at 235 n. l. According to Lee: 
The Court ... defined mixed questions of law and fact as "questions in which 
the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, 
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it 
another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or 
is not violated." 
Id. (quoting Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19). 
59. Id. at 235-36, 238. 
60. Id. at 239. 
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review, practiced by the Second, Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits;61 (3) 
a variable standard, practiced by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits;62 and (4) 
no discernible pattern of review in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits.63 Overall concerns of judicial efficiency,64 as well as credibility 
and prestige, 65 in Lee's analysis, steer courts in the direction of 
restricting the scope of appellate review because government power must 
be constrained in order to be legitimized.66 The appellate process itself 
externally constrains the district courts.67 However, because parties 
cannot automatically appeal appellate decisions to the Supreme Court, 
the Circuit Courts of Appeal do not suffer the same external constraint. 
Lee likened the one external constraint on the Circuit Courts, that of 
stare decisis, to the teeth of an old comb: strong, but "sporadically 
distributed."68 
In order to conserve its continued judicial legitimacy, an appellate 
court takes precedential baggage into account when reviewing lower 
court decisions de novo.69 Other courts will necessarily have to follow 
the appellate court's decision, often with potentially far-reaching 
ramifications.70 Professor Wechsler postulated that the "main constitu-
61. Id. at 241. 
62. Id. at 244. 
63. Id. at 245. 
64. Id. at 250-52. 
65. Id. at 252-54. 
66. Id. at 252. Interestingly, Monaghan makes much the same argument in favor 
of a duty of appellate courts to make independent review of administrative decisions. 
See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 254-63. 
67. Lee, supra note 15, at 252. But see Dalton, supra note 22, at 86-93. Dalton 
hypothesizes that the constraint may have more to do with the type of judge sitting on 
the bench than with any intrinsic, normative influence the appellate process itself has. 
For instance, if the judge is merely a bench-warmer, she will "forego the chance to be 
a heroine in order to avoid being a goat." Id. at 87. A bench builder, by contrast, takes 
her role "quite seriously," takes outcomes quite seriously, and seeks to insulate her 
opinion from review at all costs because it was arrived at as a just result. Id. 
68. Lee, supra note 15, at 253. 
69. Id. at 287. 
70. Id at 285-89. Lee applies his model of "principled decision making" to 
Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1984). In Clevenger, a 
handicapped boy's mother brought suit seeking an injunction to force the local school 
board to place her son at a particular school. The Sixth Circuit held that the issue was 
a mixed question and averred that such questions may be reviewed freely. But, it also 
said that, even under the "clearly erroneous" standard, it would overturn the district 
court. Lee analyzed the basis for the court's decision, rather than the outcome. If the 
court had made the decision based upon statutory construction, then it would have 
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ent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely princi-
pled,"71 capable of producing meaningful precedent.72 Lee postulates 
that a combination of this restrained, "principled decision-making" by 
the appellate courts when creating precedent, as well as deference to the 
lower courts in all other cases, would provide substitute constraints, 
thereby enhancing the legitimacy of appellate review.73 Thus, if the 
appellate court reviews a mixed question and constrains itself to a 
"clearly erroneous" standard, then justice may be done in the particular 
case without the danger of a broad new precedent being set. 
Lee then advanced the hypothesis that the Court was concerned about 
state actions reviewed by state court fact-finders in both obscenity and 
defamation cases, Bose notwithstanding.74 He contrasted this indepen-
dent review to the great leeway the Court granted district courts in the 
application of the law to school desegregation cases, starting with Green 
v. County School Board.75 There, the Court wanted quick results and 
that required "a great deal of district court discretion."76 Once the 
Court had clearly articulated its ultimate goal of banishing de jure 
segregation, it adopted a "hands-off' approach to district court remedies 
because de jure segregation involved the interests of a wide range of 
people.77 Lee dismissed Bose as an aberration to this pattern, "merely 
[a] reflexive application[] of the independent review practice."78 
Lee's pattern also explains the Court's decision in NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co.,79 cited by Justice Scalia in his dissent to 
precedential value that would potentially affect vast numbers of future cases. If the court 
made the decision based upon a "clearly erroneous" standard, then it was free to consider 
only the facts in this particular case without worrying about precedential value. Of 
course, the court must make this distinction quite clear in its review, lest there be 
confusion. The court did not make itself clear in Clevenger. Lee, supra note 15, at 286. 
71. Hans Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
72. Lee, supra note 15, at 237 (citing id.). 
73. Id. See also supra note 70 (discussing Lee's application of the constraints of 
deferential review as compared to de novo review in Clevenger, 744 F.2d at 514). 
74. Lee, supra note 15, at 281-84. But see Monaghan, supra note 30, at 272 ("The 
premise that state courts are to be suspected of distorted factfinding and law application 
is disquieting."). 
75. Lee, supra note 15, at 266 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 
( 1968)). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 269-70. "Despite outward appearances, it does not seem that the Court 
has abandoned its 'hands-off' approach to district court remedies in its recent decision 
of the Yonkers desegregation case, Spallone v. United States." Id. at 270 (citing Spallone 
v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (I 990)). 
78. Id. at 284 n.273 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 
U.S. 485, 518 n.2 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
79. 458 U.S. 886 ( 1982). 
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Madsen.Bo The Court overturned the Mississippi Supreme Court's 
judgment that black citizens were intimidated by an NAACP-led boycott 
of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Mississippi.BI Here 
too, the Court was ensuring that southern state courts were not systemat-
ically biased against one of the parties. In this context, "[n]on-deferen-
tial review ... amounts to little more than supervising the handiwork of 
state court fact-finders suspected of acting in bad faith. It falls well 
short of disproving the broad notion that the profer role of an appellate 
court is restricted to formulating general rules."B Monaghan expressed 
alarm that appellate courts would engage in this sort of behavior.B3 
But, indeed, the Court in Claiborne Hardware may have been doing just 
that. 
In state court cases, such as New York Times v. SullivanB4 and 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,B5 the Court was also trying to ensure 
that the civil rights movement received a fair shake. Both cases 
originated in the 1960s as de jure segregation was breathing its last 
breath. To have acted otherwise would have prolonged its death. The 
Court's actions in the school desegregation cases also conform to this 
explanation. The obscenity cases have a similar policy twist: the Court 
was attempting to end an era of unwarranted intrusion into free speech 
concerns. Both veins could well be said to reflect, at least to a degree, 
the dominant public policy concerns of the day. 
III. BACKGROUND TO VITTITOW: THE STATE OF THE LAW ON 
CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS ON PROTESTS 
The Supreme Court has defined rules concerning content-neutral 
restrictions on protests in two related contexts that deal directly with 
80. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2533 (1994) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). But, Lee's hypothesis provides a powerful counterpoint to Scalia's 
attempt to equate the two movements. For analysis of Justice Scalia's dissent, see infra 
text accompanying notes 125-33. 
81. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920-24. 
82. Lee, supra note 15, at 284. 
83. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 272 ("The premise that state courts are to be 
suspected of distorted factfinding and law application is disquieting. After all, the 
constitution presupposes that the state courts will enforce declared federal law fairly."). 
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
85. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
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antiabortion protest. The first is in the 1988 case of Frisby v. Schultz,B6 
where the Court ruled on the constitutionality of an ordinance that 
prohibited residential picketing. The second is in the 1994 case of 
Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc., where the Court, in a much 
broader opinion, seemingly created a new standard ofreview for content-
neutral injunctions.87 With these cases, the Court has defined what 
now appears to be a continuum of standards of review for First 
Amendment cases. In the traditional public forum, the Court has 
reviewed content or viewpoint based restrictions with strict scrutiny.BB 
By contrast, the Court has reviewed restrictions that it found content-
neutral with an intermediate standard of review, using a principle of 
inquiring into "whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech 'without reference to the content of the regulated speech. "'89 
In Madsen, because of repeated violation of previous court orders, the 
Court expanded the definition of content-neutral restrictions to include 
those "incidental to the ... message."90 In contrast, some members of 
the Court have reviewed areas of speech and conduct deemed as falling 
outside the scope of First Amendment protection on a rational relation 
basis.91 
With Madsen and Frisby, the Court has put an overall framework into 
place, allowing the lower courts to enforce consistent standards over a 
relatively wide range of fact patterns. In both of these cases, the Court 
conducted a largely independent review. In both instances, the state of 
the law was unsettled and the Court needed to develop constitutional 
principles "on a case by case basis."92 But, even while conducting an 
independent review, both majority opinions clearly deferred to the lower 
courts in some aspects. 
86. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
87. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). 
88. Id. at 2522. "To enforce a content-based exclusion[,] the State must show that 
its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end." Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
89. Id. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) 
(upholding noise regulations)). 
90. Id. at 2524. 
91. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(while majority used an intermediate standard of review to uphold a ban on nude 
dancing, Justice Scalia, concurring in the result, would have found nudity non-expressive 
conduct per se, separate from dancing, and thus reviewed under a rational relation 
standard). 
92. Monaghan, supra note 30, at 239. 
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A. Frisby v. Schultz 
The appellees, "strongly opposed to abortion," mounted a fa~ial 
challenge to an ordinance issued by the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin, 
in the wake of antiabortion picketing targeted at residences of abortion 
providers.93 The ordinance made it "unlawful for any person to engage 
in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individu-
al"94 and had a clearly stated, primary purpose of "protection and 
preservation of the home."95 With five justices joining an opinion 
written by Justice O'Connor,96 the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the ordinance based upon a "well-established principle that statutes will 
be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties."97 
The majority held that residential streets--even narrow ones---are 
clearly a traditional public forum. 98 The Court deferred to the lower 
courts in finding the ordinance content-neutral,99 allowing use of an 
intermediate level of scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review. 100 
Under that standard, the Court construed the ordinance's ban on protests 
as very limited. 101 It then found that the ordinance served a significant 
state interest: "'well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home. "'102 
However, Justice O'Connor did note that "particular hypothetical 
applications" could have altered the outcome on the issue of how such 
93. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1987). Appellees and others had 
picketed in groups of 11 to 40 outside the residence of a Brookfield, Wisconsin doctor 
who "apparently performs abortions ... in neighboring towns." Id. at 476. The town 
reacted by enacting the ordinance in May, 1985. The town attorney informed the 
appellees of the new ordinance and the town's intent to implement enforcement. "Faced 
with this threat of arrest and prosecution, appellees ceased picketing in Brookfield, and 
filed this lawsuit." Id. at 477. 
94. Id. at 477. 
95. Id. 
96. Justice White concurred. Id. at 488. Justices Brennan and Stevens dissented 
in separate opinions. Id. at 491,496. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in dissent. 
Id. at 491. The division occurred along lines of what standard of review should be 
applied. A similar division occurred in Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. 
Ct. 2516 (1994). See infra text accompanying notes 105-33. 
97. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483. 
98. Id. at 4 79-80. 
99. Id. at 482. 
100. Id. at 479. 
IO I. Id. at 483. 
102. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,471 (1980)). 
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an ordinance might have been enforced. 103 As discussed infra, the 
enforcement issue can readily explain the different outcome in Vittitow 
where an identically worded ordinance was found unconstitutional. 104 
B. The New Standard of Review in Madsen 
Madsen v. Womens Health Center, Inc. potentially marks a major 
shift in the Court's standard of review for cases involving injunctions 
against public protesters who target specific individuals. Courts must 
now apply "a somewhat more stringent application of general First 
Amendment principles" to injunctions that curb protests to ensure '"that 
injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendants than 
necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. "'105 
The case began in 1992 when a Florida state court permanently 
enjoined pro-life demonstrators from blocking or interfering with public 
access to an abortion clinic after a series of demonstrations aimed at 
abortion clinics and the homes of doctors and clinic workers. The trial 
court issued a broader injunction six months later when the clinic 
complained that the original injunction had not succeeded in allowing 
unimpeded access to the clinic. 106 The case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court through two different routes. The Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's injunction. 107 In a separate, but parallel 
challenge, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the injunction to 
be content-based and, thus, unconstitutional based upon a strict scrutiny 
standard of review. 108 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
this conflict. 109 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by four other justices, 
wrote the Court's opinion. 110 
I 03. Id. at 488. 
104. Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 1995). 
105. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524-25 (1994) 
(quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). 
I 06. Id. at 2521. 
107. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993). 
108. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993). 
109. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. 
I 10. Both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia wrote separate opinions advocating 
differing standards of review. Justice Scalia's advocacy of the application of strict 
scrutiny is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 125-33. In contrast to the 
majority and to Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens would have governed injunctive relief by 
a more lenient standard than legislation because an injunction is more narrowly aimed. 
Injunctions "should be judged by a standard that gives appropriate deference to the 
judge's unique familiarity with the facts." Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Furthermore, the 300-foot ban on protesters approaching persons seeking services 
prohibits a species of conduct, not speech. In that light, Stevens argues, the situation is 
analogous to labor picketing. Id. at 2532. "Physically approaching" is no broader than 
necessary given the unchallenged facts. Id. at 2533. 
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The Court used a two-step inquiry. First, it determined whether the 
injunction was content-neutral, using previously developed stan-
dards.1 11 In the second step, it developed a "more stringent application 
of general First Amendment principles."112 The Court has traditionally 
distinguished content-neutral restrictions from content-based restrictions 
because the former, if enforced properly, do not affect the nature of the 
message, only the methods used to deliver it. Content-based restrictions 
reflect a paternalistic concern about how people will react to the 
communicative impact of the message. 113 In finding that the injunction 
was indeed content-neutral, the Court explained that "the fact that the 
injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself 
render the injunction content or viewpoint based."114 The restrictions 
that this injunction directed at the protestors were "incidental to [the 
protestor's] antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the 
court's original order."115 In one of the more significant aspects of 
this case, the Court used the record to determine that the injunction was 
content-neutral, instead of merely deferring to the lower court, thereby 
setting a precedent for broader application of that definition by the lower 
courts. 116 
The majority then found that the government had demonstrated 
legitimate purposes, citing the Florida Supreme Court's decision: (1) 
"protecting a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling 
services in connection with her pregnancy;" (2) "public safety and 
order;" and (3) protecting the "State's strong interest in residential 
privacy, acknowledged in Frisby v. Schultz."117 The majority further 
held that a court must "examine each contested provision ... to see if 
it burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish its goal."118 
111. A content-neutral restriction is adopted "'without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech."' Id. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 791 (1989)). 
112. Id. at 2524. 
113. A classic fear of the message may be found in the World War I cases, such 
as Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (speech advocating draft avoidance was 
punishable). Yet, in the 196Os, a much different approach was taken. See supra note 
7. 
114. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 2523-24. 
117. Id. at 2526 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1987)). 
118. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526. 
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The injunction handed down by the Florida state court119 followed 
earlier, more narrowly based injunctions that had apparently failed to 
ensure access to the blockaded clinic. 120 The Court held that some of 
the restrictions in the injunction covering access to the clinic, 121 noise 
levels in its vicinity, 122 restrictions on sidewalk counseling, 123 and the 
use of sound amplification equipment passed muster and others did not. 
The Court also restricted the scope of injunctions against residential 
picketing. 124 
Reflecting the divisive nature of the underlying context of abortion, 
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, demanded that the court use a 
standard of strict scrutiny because the distinctive characteristics of an 
injunction were, for reasons of policy and precedent, as fully in need of 
such a level of review as "content-basis" for doing so. 125 His policy 
reasons included: (1) danger that injunctions may be sought against a 
single issue advocacy group by persons and organizations with a 
business or social interest in "suppressing that group's point of 
view"; 126 and (2) injunctions 
119. Id. at 2521-22. 
120. Id. at 2521. 
121. The 36-foot buffer near clinic entrances passed muster with the new standard 
of review because "some deference must be given to the state court's familiarity with 
the facts and background of the dispute ... even under our heightened review." Id. at 
2527. But, the Court distinguished the 36-foot buffer on the back and sides of clinic, 
which bordered other private property. "Absent evidence that petitioners standing on 
private property have obstructed access to the clinic ... this portion of the buffer zone 
fails to serve the significant government interests relied on by the Florida Supreme 
Court." Id. at 2528. 
122. Restrictions on high noise levels outside the clinic were also upheld. "The 
First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake 
Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests." Id. at 2528. In contrast 
to its rulings on noise levels, the Court found "images observable," such as signs and 
banners, a different kettle of fish. Id. at 2529. The Court held that "it is much easier 
for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears, and no more is 
required to avoid seeing placards through the windows of the clinic." Id. 
123. On the grounds that the consent provision burdened more speech than 
necessary in restricting sidewalk counselling, the Court invalidated the ban on protesters 
approaching anyone within 300 feet of the clinic entrance without her consent in order 
to prevent "clinic patients and staff from being 'stalked' or 'shadowed"' by the 
protesters. Id. 
124. The "prohibition against picketing, demonstrating, or using sound amplification 
equipment within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff' failed because alternatives 
were available. Compared to the zone provided for in Frisby, the Court found the 300-
foot ban on picketing around residences was much too large based on the record. Id. at 
2529-30. The zone around the residences was too big in light of possible alternative 
limitations on "time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller 
zone." Id. 
125. Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
126. Id. at 2539. 
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are the product of individual judges rather than of legislatures----and often of 
judges who have been chagrined by prior disobedience of their orders. The 
right to free speech should not lightly be placed within the control of a single 
man or woman. . . . [T]he injunction is a much more powerful weapon than a 
statute. 127 
Persons subject to an injunction face a Robson's choice if they have no 
money or time to lodge an appeal: remain silent or face contempt 
proceedings. 128 
Scalia felt that this injunction was really content-based anyway. The 
residual coverage of '"all persons acting in concert or participation with 
[the named individuals and organizations], or on their behalf' would not 
include those who merely entertained the same beliefs and wished to 
express the same views as the named defendants."129 He quoted 
colloquies in his dissent that, in his view, demonstrated that the revised 
injunction "is tailored to restrain persons distinguished, not by 
proscribable conduct, but by proscribable views."130 He vehemently 
protested that the record failed to demonstrate any violence. But, even 
where "First Amendment activity is intermixed with violent conduct, 
'precision of regulation' is demanded."131 Justice Scalia unfavorably 
compared the Madsen majority's holding to the holding in NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., where blacks were protesting various forms of 
racial discrimination. 132 He called abortion protesters a "disfavored 
class." 133 
Within a few months of the Court handing down the Madsen opinion, 
the Sixth Circuit heard an appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by 
an Ohio district court prior to Madsen. This injunction stayed enforce-
ment of an ordinance patterned after Frisby. The district court had 
issued the injunction against the protesters limiting the scope of their 
picketing of the residence of a doctor who performed abortions. 134 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 2539-40 ( quoting from the language of the injunction). 
130. Id. at 2540. 
131. Id. at 2541 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)). 
132. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2542-43 (referring to NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co., 458 U.S. 886 ( I 982)). 
133. Id. 
134. See Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d I JOO (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 2276 (1995). 
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IV. VITTITOW V. CITY OF UPPER ARLINGTON 
A. Facts 
In 1991, plaintiffs targeted the residence of Dr. Raymond Robinson, 
a doctor living in Upper Arlington who performed abortions in Dayton, 
as a focal point for a number of protests. 135 Dr. Robinson lived on a 
cul-de-sac where a few other homes also stood. Plaintiffs repeated their 
protests in April, 1992.136 In August, 1992, the City Council respond-
ed by passing an ordinance that read: "No person shall engage in 
picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in 
this City."137 Plaintiffs again targeted the doctor in October, 1992. 
Police responded to a complaint and asked plaintiffs to leave after 
determining that probable cause existed that a specific house was 
targeted in contravention of the ordinance. Plaintiffs left without further 
incident. Police took a videotape of the incident. 138 
Plaintiffs then brought an action in district court seeking an injunction 
against the enforcement of the ordinance, alleging that it violated their 
constitutional rights under the First Amendment. 139 The district court 
issued a preliminary order enjoining the city from enforcing the 
ordinance. But, the order provided for conditional enforcement: 
1) Picketers shall continue moving at all times and shall not stop or gather in 
front of or around any residence; 2) Picketers shall not give undue emphasis to 
directing their activities to one residence; 3) The presence or absence of signs, 
banners, etc. shall not in any way diminish or enhance the activities of the 
picketers; 4) Picketers shall at all times be mindful of the legitimate and 
compelling interest of the City of Upper Arlington to maintain traffic and 
safety-particularly as it applies to children. Picketers are directed to obey any 
legitimate orders of the police concerning the safety of those in the area being 
picketed; 5) The City of Upper Arlington shall adopt, issue and post appropriate 
written authority to comply with this Order within thirty (30) days of the 
issuance of the Court's pending Opinion and Order. 140 
Sua sponte, the district court modified its order because it considered 
the original order unworkable. The court held that: 
I. Defendants may not prevent plaintiffs from picketing in any particular 
residential neighborhood, street, or cul-de-sac. 2. Defendants may, however, 
properly prevent plaintiffs from picketing in front of: (a) the doctor's home, 
135. Id. at 1101. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 1101-02 & n.3. 
139. Id. at 1102. 
140. Id. 
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and (b) the two homes on either side of the doctor's home. 3. Similarly, 
defendants may properly prevent plaintiffs or others from picketing in front of: 
(a) the home of anyone defendants have probable cause to believe is the target, 
focus or subject of the picketing, as well as (b) the two homes on either side 
of the home just described. 141 
Both parties appealed this later injunction. 142 
B. The Sixth Circuit's Analysis of the Injunction 
The appeals court held that the injunction itself was content-neutral 
under the inquiry used in Madsen. 143 "[N]one of the restrictions 
imposed by the court were directed at the contents of [plaintiffs'] 
message .... 144 The injunction (as well as the ordinance) seeks to 
regulate not plaintiffs' message, but rather the means by which plaintiffs 
seek to convey their message."145 The court also found that the 
ordinance itself was content-neutral, citing the Frisby Court's concerns 
about "privacy of the home."146 
The court then inquired into "whether the challenged provisions [of 
the injunction] burden no more speech than is necessary to serve that 
interest."147 The plaintiffs contended that the "modified injunction 
would allow the City to arrest and prosecute individuals for doing little 
more than walking down a city sidewalk."148 The court used both 
Frisby and Madsen as a basis for a de novo inquiry into the injunction, 
as well as into the enforcement of the ordinance. 
141. Id. at I 102-03 (citing Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 830 F. Supp. 1077, 
1083 (S.D. Ohio 1993)). 
142. Id. at I 102. 
143. Id. at 1104. 
144. Id. (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523 
(1994)). 
145. Id. 
146. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484 (1988). Justice O'Connor's opinion, 
extensively quoted in Vittitow, went on to say, "Our prior decisions have often remarked 
on the unique nature of the home, 'the last citadel of the tired, the weary and the sick."' 
Id. (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)). She 
also wrote that "[ o ]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the 
unwilling listener. ... [A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their 
own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions." Id. 
at 484-85. 
147. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1105. 
148. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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The Vittitow court noted that the Frisby Court "saved [the ordinance] 
by the extraordinary measure of accepting counsel's representation at 
oral argument before the Supreme Court as to how the ordinance would 
be enforced."149 The Vittitow court then chastised the city for adopting 
the Frisby ordinance language when "a federal district judge, a divided 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and four Supreme Court Justices 
found it to be overbroad."150 Ultimately, the Vittitow court found 
enforcement of the ordinance to contravene the Madsen standard. 151 
It used this record of enforcement to distinguish Frisby. 151 The court 
further noted: 
Finally, and most important, the videotape and the testimony in this case 
indicate how the City reads Frisby in enforcing this ordinance. The videotape 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit H) demonstrates that the City's police view the ordinance 
as violated when they can discern one residence as being the target of picketing. 
In our view, that is a misreading of Frisby. All picketing of this nature will 
have a target, otherwise it is not really picketing. Frisby could not be more 
clear: "[O]nly focused p,icketing taking place solely in front of a particular 
residence is prohibited." 53 
However, in this finding, the court did not explain exactly what in the 
district court's opinion offended it. The court merely took issue with the 
trial judge who "tried to save this ordinance with a one-size-fits-all 
injunction."154 The court said that "the complete ban on residential 
picketing mandated by the ordinance [is] inconsistent" with Madsen and 
entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. 155 
The court refused to remand the case to the district court to have the 
injunction, the ordinance, and the enforcement of the ordinance 
reconsidered in light of the Madsen standard. As the dissent pointed out, 
the district court had yet to hold a full hearing on the merits. 156 The 
Vittitow court justified its actions by recognizing that federal '"courts do 
not rewrite statutes to create constitutionality."'157 It furthermore 
chastised the city for failing to learn from Frisby in writing such a broad 
149. Id. at 1106. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. (distinguishing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1987)). In Frisby, 
Justice O'Connor expressed the concern that such an ordinance might well have been 
found unconstitutional if it had been improperly enforced. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488. See 
also supra text accompanying note I 03. 
153. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1106-07 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483). 
154. Id. at I 107. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). 
157. Id. at 1106 (quoting Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir. 
1991)). 
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ordinance. 158 Nor would the court give either plaintiff or the city "an 
advisory opinion as to how the ordinance might be enforced."159 
C. The Dissent 
Judge Martin's dissent focussed on the procedural posture of the case 
and did not argue the merits of the injunction, the ordinance, or the 
enforcement of the ordinance. He postulated that the merits of the 
ordinance had never been argued. 160 In his eyes, the district court had 
merely issued a preliminary injunction, an equitable remedy designed to 
"maintain the relative positions of the parties until proceedings on the 
merits [could] be conducted."161 Judge Martin argued that FRCP Rule 
65(a)(2) does allow a consolidated proceeding when an injunction is 
issued, but that did not occur in this case. 162 
Because this was a preliminary injunction only, Judge Martin said that 
the appropriate standard of review should have been one of deference. 
The "decision of a district court to grant a preliminary injunction is 
'generally accorded a great deal of deference on appellate review and 
will only be disturbed if the court relied upon clearly erroneous findings 
of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal 
standard. "'163 He found "no clear error."164 In his eyes, the majority 
obviously thought that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits. "The 
majority should have stopped its analysis there and affirmed the district 
court as to the propriety of issuing the injunction, assuming they find no 
158. Id. at I 107. 
159. Id. 
I 60. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at I 107-08. 
163. Id. at I I 08 (quoting Michigan Coalition v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th 
Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 954 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1992)). The dissent said 
that, in reviewing a preliminary injunction, it must balance four factors in reviewing only 
for abuse of discretion. These factors are: 
"(I) the likelihood that the party seeking the preliminary injunction will 
succeed on the merits of the claim; (2) whether the party seeking the 
injunction will suffer irreparable harm without the grant of the extraordinary 
relief; (3) the probability that granting the injunction will cause substantial 
harm to others; and ( 4) whether the public interest is advanced by the issuance 
of the injunction." 
Id. at 1108-09 (quoting Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
164. Id. at 1109. 
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error in the district courts' findings and conclusions on the other 
factors." 165 
Even though Judge Martin found no abuse of discretion in the granting 
of the injunction itself, he went on to say that the district court could 
abuse its discretion in the scope of the injunction. He said that the 
scope of the injunction was the "crux of the parties' disput(}-whether 
the three ( or five) house buffer zone is constitutional"166 under the 
standards of Frisby,167 and under Madsen, 168 which was decided after 
the parties briefed the issues. He further stated, "Because the size of the 
buffer zone at issue here is unclear, I would construe the injunction as 
creating a three-house zone and would remand for the district court to 
clarify its order accordingly."169 
Judge Martin clearly viewed Frisby as balancing the "residential 
privacy interests of the homeowner with the First Amendment rights of 
the picketers who were, as here, engaged in focused, targeted picket-
ing."170 Using the Supreme Court's rationale of balancing competing 
interests, he construed Frisby as not preventing the banning of "forms 
of targeted, focused residential picketing" other than that "taking place 
solely in front of one home."171 
In this case, 
[ m ]erely because the plaintiffs chose to march slowly by other residences, as 
well as the targeted residence, does not insulate their activity from regulation. 
The targeted homeowner is as much a captive audience when picketers 
repeatedly march in front of a home as when they are standing still. The 
psychological injury and disturbance to the tranquility of the home are not 
reduced because the picketers are marching slowly. 172 
With that, Judge Martin would have affirmed the district court's 
injunction as proper in seeking to curb the undesirable effects of 
plaintiffs' targeted picketing. 173 
Judge Martin was critical of the new standard of review in Madsen. 
"Because [it] does not alter my analysis, I wonder if this is a 'new' test 
for content-neutral injunctions."174 He did not believe that the Madsen 
Court correctly interpreted Frisby. He did not see Frisby as creating a 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 1110. 
167. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1987). 
168. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). 
169. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1110 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
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zone as did the Madsen Court. 175 He viewed the striking down of a 
300-foot zone around the residence of a target of the picketing as heavily 
fact-dependent. 176 Indeed, the Madsen Court held that "the record 
before us does not contain sufficient justification for this broad a ban on 
picketing."177 
Even so, using the Madsen standard, Judge Martin would have found 
the three-house zone "no more burdensome than necessary to protect the 
significant governmental interest in protecting residential privacy."178 
Judge Martin was very aware of the difference in facts in individual 
cases when he contrasted the thirty-six foot buffer in front of the clinic 
in Madsen with the cul-de-sac in Vittitow. 179 He was concerned that, 
given the physical layout of the cul-de-sac, a zone might not be 
adequate. He thought that even limiting the number of picketers could 
be justified.180 
Judge Martin then called for the Supreme Court to modify traditional 
public fora analysis of residential streets and sidewalks. 181 Several 
factors, such as whether the residents of these streets would consider 
them "traditional public fora," private ownership of the fee to the land 
underlying the streets, and private maintenance of sidewalks in many 
neighborhoods, combined with residential privacy interests, led him "to 
believe that it's time to reconsider whether all streets over which the 
public may travel are traditional public fora." 182 
175. Id. As Judge Martin correctly points out, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion 
accepts the creation of a zone in Frisby as a matter of course. The word "zone" does 
not appear anywhere on the cited page in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,483 (1988). 
The Frisby opinion's emphasis on a balancing of interests, as highlighted by Judge 
Martin, meshes with this author's analysis infra calling for a more limited appellate 
review when the case law is well settled. Judge Martin's interpretation of Frisby 
neutralizes criticism of that opinion for not fully exploring all of the permutations that 
an ordinance and its subsequent enforcement could create by allowing a balancing of 
interests to take place. That balance really is at the heart of the face-off between the 
competing parties. 
176. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1111. 
177. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. 
178. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1111 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Madsen, I 14 S. Ct. at 
2524). 
I 79. Id. 




V. WHY MADSEN-TYPE CASES ESCAPE THE "CHILLING EFFECT" 
DANGERS 
Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent to Madsen that the context for 
the new standard of review is abortion, but the case itself is all about an 
injunction against free speech. 183 Kathleen Sullivan sounded the tocsin 
about the chilling effect of First Amendment regulation in an article 
chronicling "a recent sea change in the politics of free speech."184 She 
cited the "various recent measures to curtail the obstruction of abortion 
clinics by anti-abortion demonstrators," such as passage of FACE and 
the holding in Madsen, as exemplars of that sea change. She pointed out 
that Operation Rescue and other antiabortion groups make the argument 
that they should be protected by the same free speech doctrines that 
protected the civil rights movement, "but advocacy groups that typically 
argue for free speech pointedly have not flocked to their defense."185 
Justice Scalia sounded a similar theme when he called the abortion 
protesters a "disfavored class,"186 unfavorably comparing the outcome 
of Madsen to that in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,187 where 
nonviolent aspects of a boycott of local businesses, marred by sporadic 
outbreaks of violence, were held '"entitled to the protection of the First 
Amendment. "'188 These concerns echo those of the Court in New York 
Times, Bose, and other cases discussed supra. 189 Sullivan proffered a 
possible institutional framework to articulate the dangers of government 
regulation of speech, involving three possibilities: first, the '"banned in 
Boston' phenomenon-making speech taboo may perversely increase 
demand"; second, the risk of error when government regulates speech as 
compared to, say, commercial regulation; and third, the danger of 
trusting government to change culture. 190 
But, neither the standard of review in Madsen nor controlling the 
scope of appellate review ostensibly try to ban content-based speech. 
That alone reduces the risk of a chilling effect. By contrast, in New 
York Times v. Sullivan, the Alabama courts were trying to attack the 
183. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2534-35 (1994) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
184. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203 (1994). 
185. Id. at 206. 
186. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2542. 
187. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
188. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2543 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Claiborne 
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915). 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 56-85. 
190. Sullivan, supra note 184, at 214. 
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very content of the advertisements in question. 191 The one goal that 
Madsen does not have is that of trying to change culture. It and Frisby 
are faced with balancing the competing, constitutionally protected 
interests of two nearly irreconcilable groups: the antiabortion picketers 
(with their right to protest) and the abortion providers and the women 
seeking abortions (with their rights to residential privacy and access to 
abortion facilities). The very act of balancing these interests is likely to 
increase dialogue, not stifle it. 
Justice Scalia is correct when he points out that a single district court 
judge issuing an injunction may involve some risk that a particular 
application of a content-neutral standard could be pretextual. 192 But 
appellate review, even of the relatively restricted "clearly erroneous" 
standard, stands as a formidable external constraint on any district court 
judge's abuse of discretion. 193 Furthermore, systematic bias has 
historically been a state court problem, not federal. Claiborne Hardware 
was a paradigm for Lee's observations about systematic state court bias, 
where the state courts' seemingly content-neutral standard was merely 
pretext and really aimed at the message itself. 194 The Court has 
always reviewed First Amendment cases de novo because the fairness of 
state court review of state actions was in question. 195 
The risk of a "chilling effect" may also be decreased because the pro-
life movement, as a single issue movement, may be quite distinguishable 
from past protest movements, such as the civil rights movement, in the 
extent of the protest the movement should allow itself. Both former 
Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and philosopher John Rawls make 
cogent arguments that a right to protest may be limited in a reasonably 
just society. 
191. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
192. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539 ("often [issued by] judges who have been 
chagrined by prior disobedience of their orders"). 
I 93. Lee, supra note 15, at 237, 252. See also Dalton, supra note 22, at 86-93. See 
also supra text accompanying notes 69-78, especially notes 70 and 73. 
194. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915-16 n.50 (1982) 
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)) ("This Court's duty is not limited 
to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also ... review the evidence ... 
particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across 'the line between speech 
unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated."'). 
195. Lee, supra note 15, at 281-84. 
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VI. WHY JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL PUBLIC POLICY BENEFITS IN 
ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST CASES 
Former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas examined the issues of 
dissent and civil disobedience in American society in 1968, at the height 
of the antiwar and civil rights movements, examining the paradox of the 
duty to obey and to disobey. 196 He recognized that 
the citizen has the right, protected by the Constitution, to criticize, however 
intemperately; to protest, however strongly; to draw others to his cause; and in 
mass, peaceably to assemble. The state must not only respect these rights and 
refrain from punishing their exercise but it must also protect the dissenter 
against other citizens who seek by force, harassment, or interference to prevent 
him from exercising these rights. 197 
Fortas then opined that the United States has not always lived up to this 
theory. 198 Yet, in Fortas's eyes, "this obviously does not mean that the 
state must tolerate anything and everything that includes opposition to 
the government or to government law or policy .... 199 The state may 
and should act if the protest includes ... substantial interference with [] 
the rights of others .... "20° Clearly, Fortas's theme recognized that 
the competing interests of the various sides involved in dissent must be 
balanced and that, in theory, that balance will be a level one even if, in 
practice, it may occasionally be tilted one way or another.201 
In 1971, John Rawls wrote his magnum opus, A Theory of Justice, 
examining the same issues in the broader context of delineating the rules 
by which a society should proceed in order to be just.202 In it, he 
advanced a position that one's duty to obey the law may well override 
one's right to resist injustice, when, under certain conditions, they 
confl.ict.203 These themes, when combined with the increased certainty 
196. ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968). 
197. Id. at 43-44. 
198. Id. 
I 99. Id. at 47. 
200. Id. at 48. 
20 I. Id. at 52. 
202. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
203. Id. at 350-55. But see Daniel M. Farrell, Dealing With Injustice in a 
Reasonably Just Society: Some Observations on Rawls' Theory of Political Duty, in 
JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 187 (H. Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith 
eds., 1980). Farrell calls Rawls's contention of political duty into question because the 
effects of decisions made in the original position cannot be predicted and, thus, only 
principles can be decided on. Society must then implement those principles when 
confronted with a problem. Farrell contends that Rawls's position really is a form of 
institutionalism for which there are no compelling arguments. However, he leaves the 
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of enforcement brought on by a reduced scope of review, and the lack 
of "chilling effect" discussed supra, support controlling the scope of 
review in Madsen injunction cases as opposed to broader movements, 
such as the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Key to this 
argument is the basic assumption, discussed supra, that district courts 
have yet to exhibit a systematic bias against a particular side in the 
abortion debate, as distinguished from the systematic bias Lee observed 
in state courts in defamation and obscenity cases.204 
A. Rawls and A Theory of Justice 
If Justice Fortas was speaking specifically to a generation involved in 
the paroxysms of the civil rights movement and antiwar protests, his 
message still has currency today. John Rawls, writing at about the same 
time, approaching the right of dissent and the duty of obeying the law 
from a more theoretical level, arrives at a similar conclusion, but with 
a paradigm for discussing how that balance may be struck. He does so 
by looking not at "our system of government" per se, but at the very 
nature of the contract between a society and its people. Indeed, Rawls 
sees "justice as fairness" as an example of what he called a contract 
theory.205 Parties to a social contract must make decisions about this 
contract and the nature of the fundamental agreements in it in an 
"original position." Starting at the original position ensures the creation 
of a "fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just."206 
This original position, then, must be found behind a "veil of ignorance" 
where the parties do not know certain kinds of facts, such as one's place 
in society, intelligence, and cultural biases.207 
Rawls posits that, in the original position, parties to the contract will 
accept some form of majority rule and a set of procedures, because 
question open until Rawls's reasoning is more clearly elucidated. This does not call into 
question, however, Rawls's position on civic duty of a member of the reasonably just 
society to obey the law over civilly protesting an injustice. 
204. See text accompanying notes 74-85. 
205. RAWLS, supra note 202, at 16. 
206. Id. at 136. 
207. For a more complete discussion, see id. at 136-42. For a critical assessment 
of the veil of ignorance, see Louis I. Katzner, The Original Position and the Veil of 
Ignorance, in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 42 (H. 
Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith eds., 1980). 
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consent to these procedures is "surely preferable to no agreement at 
all."208 In accepting majority rule, the parties take a duty of civility 
that imposes "a due acceptance of the defects of the institutions and a 
certain restraint in taking advantage of them"; without them, mutual trust 
and confidence would break down.209 
Rawls's theory allows civil disobedience, defined as public, nonvio-
lent, conscientious, yet political acts,210 to occur in opposition to 
"instances of substantial and clear injustice, and preferably to those 
which obstruct the path to removing other injustices."211 He defined 
three conditions that a movement must meet to practice civil disobedi-
ence in a reasonably just society. The first is whether the object of 
protest is appropriate for civil disobedience.212 The second is that the 
political process has failed, even though "normal appeals to the political 
majority have already been made in good faith."213 The third condi-
tion arises when the natural duty of justice requires a certain re-
straint;214 society can absorb only so much civil disobedience or else 
serious disorder could follow and disrupt "the efficacy of the just 
constitution. "215 
If the pro-life movement can meet these conditions, they could and 
should, under Rawls's theory, engage in a campaign of civil disobedi-
ence with the government giving them wide latitude. If the movement 
cannot meet these conditions, then society cannot tolerate civil disobedi-
ence, let alone violent protest. To preserve social stability, the 
government may fashion limits to the scope of allowable protest in order 
to balance the rights of the rest of the society against those of the 
movement. 
208. RAWLS, supra note 202, at 354. This logic calls to mind Hobbes's aphorism 
of "the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" in the absence of societal 
constraints. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 186 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin 
Books 197 I) ( I 651 ). 
209. RAWLS, supra note 202, at 355. 
2 I 0. Id. at 364. 
211. Id. at 372. 
212. Id. at 371-73. 
213. Id. at 373. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 374. Rawls assumes that 
there is a limit on the extent to which civil disobedience can be engaged in 
without leading to a breakdown in the respect for law. . . . There is also an 
upper bound on the ability of the public forum to handle such forms of dissent 
. . . . [T]he effectiveness of civil disobedience as a form of protest declines 
beyond a certain point; and those contemplating it must consider these 
constraints. 
Id. ( emphasis supplied). 
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A comparative analysis of the pro-life movement with another, now 
universally accepted, civil disobedience campaign may help illuminate 
whether the pro-life movement meets Rawls's three conditions. 
Accepting the pro-life argument that abortion is murder, then the 
movement clearly meets Rawls's first condition. In this analysis, one 
could also stipulate that there are no competing protest movements 
forcing curtailment of the overall level of dissent, thus meeting Rawls's 
third condition.216 The critical question is whether the movement has 
met the second condition or not. 
To meet the second condition, the political process must have failed 
the movement. Legal means of redress would have proved ineffective. 
The indifference of the political parties to the movement's demands to 
have laws repealed or modified would exemplify such a failure. Another 
example would be failure of legal protest and demonstrations, especially 
over a period of time.217 It would not be inaccurate to describe the 
civil rights movement in the mid-1950s and 1960s as facing a failed 
political process. Seventy-five years of institutionalized Jim Crow in the 
South had effectively marginalized blacks. White dominance of the 
political process was complete. The march on Birmingham, Alabama in 
1963 starkly symbolized the daunting odds blacks in the South faced, 
even when certain parts of the political process had begun to operate in 
favor of redressing the imbalance of the races.218 
The pro-life movement in 1995 has a degree of access to the political 
system undreamed of by the civil rights movement prior to the mid-
l 960s. Numerous Supreme Court decisions have altered the Court's 
position on abortion since Roe v. Wade,219 although it has not been 
216. However, as Rawls indicated (see supra note 215), even one protest movement 
at a time could be too much for the society if it is excessive, not to mention that the 
movement could reach a point of diminishing returns. See RAWLS, supra note 202, at 
373. 
217. Id. 
218. For a more complete analysis of the origins of the civil rights movement in the 
1950s and early I 960s, and a recounting of the failure of the political process, see 
HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY (2d ed. 1993). For a focus 
more on the leaders themselves and the origins of their philosophical underpinnings, see 
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS !954-63 
(I 988). 
219. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (characterizing a woman's choice on whether to have an 
abortion as a fundamental right of privacy protected under the Substantive Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Numerous decisions, culminating in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, SOS U.S. 833 (1992), have considerably undercut the scope of the 
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completely reversed. Although many prov1s1ons have been ruled 
unconstitutional under Roe, numerous state legislatures have passed laws 
severely restricting access to abortion, powerfully demonstrating pro-life 
influence.220 Even President Bush advocated a constitutional amend-
ment restricting abortion.221 Congress has, since 1977, restricted 
federal funding for abortions.222 The Republican Party has openly 
debated adoption of an anti-abortion stance in every presidential election 
since 1980.223 
Despite the lack of success in achieving all of their aims, the pro-life 
movement has demonstrably shifted the terms of the abortion debate 
over the course of the last twenty years. These characteristics do not 
denote a failure of the political process, but rather show a political 
process with the capacity to balance, albeit imperfectly, two seemingly 
irreconcilable political movements. With this sort of access to an 
ongoing political dialogue, the pro-life movement fails to meet Rawls's 
second condition. With this failure, recourse to civil disobedience falls 
outside the bounds of acceptable protest under Rawls's theory. The pro-
life movement would appear duty bound to accept limits to the scope of 
their protest even if they find it unjust. 
The nature of the violence surrounding the two movements also 
strongly distinguishes them. The civil rights movement itself drew on 
strong themes of nonviolence throughout the 1950s and 1960s.224 
fundamental right to choice. 
220. See. e.g., the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in I 988 
and 1989, which formed the basis for the challenge culminating in Planned Parenthood, 
505 U.S. at 833. 
221. This position represented a major political shift for Bush, who was pro-choice 
as recently as the 1980 election. Presumably, he would not have made this public volte-
face without a calculation of the political capital he was likely to gain. It also reflects 
the potency of the pro-life lobby to the Republican Party and the resulting healthy 
respect for it that some politicians developed. See, e.g., Gerald F. Seib, The Inaugura-
tion: Into the Fray, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1989, at R7 ("Earlier in his career ... [he] 
opposed a constitutional amendment banning abortion, yet he campaigned in 1988 ... 
in favor of an abortion amendment."). 
222. Eric Pianin, Senate Keeps Medicaid Abortion Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 
1993, at A 11 (Senate voted to keep restrictions on public funding for abortions that had, 
in various guises, been in place since the Hyde Amendment was first adopted in 1977). 
223. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Abortion Battle Cry Heard Inside GOP; Rights Supporters 
Vow Fight to Remove or Weaken Party Plank, WASH. POST, July 21, 1991, at A4 
(describing the struggle between pro-choice and pro-life factions in months prior to the 
I 992 general election campaign). See also Republicans Backed by Abortion Foes, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 12, 1995, at AIO ("The head of the Christian Coalition said 
yesterday he believes the Republican Party will keep its anti-abortion stance and that it 
is the Democratic Party 'that has an abortion problem.'"). 
224. See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 218, at 140 (in a speech in Montgomery, 
Alabama in December of 1955, Martin Luther King declared at a rally in the early days 
of the Montgomery bus boycott, "Now let us say that we are not here advocating 
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Violence was visited upon the movement from southern whites opposed 
to desegregation.225 The pro-life movement faces a much different 
political picture. By all accounts, violence in the abortion debate has 
largely sprung from the fringe elements of the movement itself.226 
Arguably, a movement that has engendered the violence itself is under 
even more of a duty than otherwise to obey Rawls's tenet. 
The Madsen restraints, while appearing unjust to the pro-life 
movement, lie quite plausibly within the acceptable bounds of justice 
when viewed in the context of the failure of the pro-life movement to 
meet Rawls's conditions, the violence surrounding the movement 
originating from its fringe elements, and the lack of a "chilling effect" 
on the exercise of First Amendment rights, as discussed supra. 
Therefore, the state may, and should, enforce content-neutral restrictions 
in order to balance the various competing interests. The Supreme Court, 
if it had not already endorsed this proposition in its two-track analysis 
of content-based and content-neutral speech, has explicitly acknowledged 
the acceptability of limits to the way a message is delivered by 
developing the new "intermediate plus" standard of review in 
Madsen.227 The Court has, more clearly than ever, articulated the 
difference between a state apparatus crushing the message228 and the 
state trying to control the dysfunctional externalities attendant to a 
particular method of dissent.229 
violence .... We have overcome that. ... The only weapon that we have in our hands 
this evening is the weapon of protest."). 
225. For a particularly compelling account of the nature of the extremist reactions 
to the 1963 campaign in Birmingham, Alabama, see id. at 793-800. 
226. See, e.g., Henry Chu & Mike Clary, Doctor, Volunteer Slain Outside Abortion 
Clinic, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at A I ("Hill often demonstrated outside the clinic 
[ where the victims were slain] with placards advocating violence against doctors who 
perform abortions."). 
227. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994) ("[W]hen 
evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and 
mannet analysis is not sufficiently rigorous."). 
228. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court 
limited a state's power to award damages in libel actions by developing what has 
become widely known as the "New York Times malice" test and by insisting upon de 
novo review of such cases. As Lee pointed out, this case took place during the middle 
of the Civil Rights movement in a state, Alabama, that was fiercely resisting the 
dismantling of Jim Crow. See supra text accompanying notes 69-85. 
229. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. 
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Clearly, Justice Scalia and others do not support that contention.230 
Others have postulated that the courts and legislatures should not 
exercise the limits defined by Madsen and FACE because to do so may 
"cut off pro-lifers' every hope in these matters. In order for pro-lifers 
to work within the system, they must believe that their views can 
somehow in the end have an impact."231 However, those arguments 
tend to lose their force in view of the conclusion reached through 
Rawlsian analysis: the pro-life movement can-and has for 
years---adequately accessed the political system. The Madsen limits also 
do not preclude public protest per se nor do they in any way impinge 
upon the expression of particular viewpoints. Indeed, by providing a 
legal mechanism for separating the two sides, they provide a possible 
mechanism for easing the conditions that may be leading to some of the 
extreme examples of violence. 
B. Theory of Certainty of Enforcement 
The best way to enforce any law is with certainty.232 The restriction 
of the scope of appellate review in federal actions will add to the 
certainty of enforcement. Protesters will not be able to delay the 
enforcement of injunctions by appealing, unless the district court judges 
have abused their discretion in the application of established law. The 
injunctions will be seen as a line drawn in the sand to constrain the 
behavior of protesters. "'The certainty of a punishment, even if it be 
moderate, will always make a stronger impression than the fear of 
another which is more terrible but combined with the hope of impuni-
ty. "'233 Deterrence is one of the central tenets in support of granting 
injunctions in cases of civil disobedience, let alone violent protest. Even 
those who oppose the use of injunctions to curb civil disobedience 
230. Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
231. Stith, supra note l O (interpreting Madsen as enjoining sidewalk counselling, 
which cuts off pro-lifers' hope to work within the system nonviolently); see also 
Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 135-36 (criticizing efforts to limit antiabortion protests 
through the use of injunctions and ordinances, citing fear of an inevitable "chilling 
effect"). 
232. Debate has raged heavily about the deterrent value of the death penalty. See 
Frank G. Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A Common Sense 
Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587,588 (1982). The author argues that punishment has 
a deterrent value, despite being empirically unprovable, because the "pure threat of 
sanction as a deterrent to criminal activity ... is logically compelling." Id. at 605. 
233. RALPH D. ELLIS & CAROL S. ELLIS, THEORIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A 
CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL 7 (1989) (quoting CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND 
PUNISHMENTS ] ] (1963)). 
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concede that enforcement of ordinances that protect the homes of protest 
targets have their role.234 
In the abortion protest cases, deterrence is only the penultimate goal. 
The ultimate goal is a reduction in the intensity of the atmosphere 
surrounding the clinics that should lead to a change in tactics by the pro-
life movement. The various pro-life groups might actually limit 
themselves.235 If the pro-life movement adopts other tactics, such as 
renewed pressure within the political system, and other types of 
campaigns to influence public opinion, then the danger of violence as an 
outgrowth of the clinic protests may decrease. 
The focus upon the clinics as the source of evil, from the perspective 
of the pro-life movement, has increased the likelihood of violence.236 
Thus, changing the focus to the political process, which, even now, 
appears to be as accessible as ever,237 may defuse the heightened 
tensions that now exist around the clinics. 
By limiting the scope of appellate review to the "clearly erroneous" 
standard or to an "abuse of discretion" standard, both injunctions and 
ordinances will receive the Madsen standard of review. The demonstra-
ble lack of systematic bias within the federal system protects against the 
need for the level of independent review that the Supreme Court 
exercised in the obscenity and defamation cases.238 If the combination 
of a clear federal cause of action under FACE and the certainty of 
enforcement of injunctions had been available in Melbourne, Florida, the 
years of tension and the threat of violence there could have been 
attenuated.239 Conceivably, the December, 1994 murders in Massachu-
setts might have been avoided if the atmosphere outside that clinic had 
been less charged. 
234. Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 128. 
235. Id. at 135. 
236. Douglas Frantz, The Rhetoric of Terror, TIME, Mar. 27, 1995, at 48. 
237. Republicans Backed, supra note 223. See also White House 1996 GOP 
Pla!form: Pro-Lifers Call For Return to Party Values, AM. POL. NETWORK ABORTION 
REP., Mar. 20, 1995 (Focus on Family President James Dobson called on Republican 
National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour not to ignore evangelical Christians and 
to ensure that the pro-life plank remains in the GOP platform. The Family Research 
Council's Gary Bauer threatened formation ofa third party for the 1996 elections if the 
Republicans did not sufficiently adhere to the pro-life stance.). 
238. See supra text accompanying notes 56-85. 
239. See Biskupic, supra note 2. 
487 
Empirically, this conclusion would be difficult to prove.240 But, if 
one accepts Rawls's notion of a duty of civility, even when the law is 
a perceived injustice, then stimulating the pro-life movement into 
heightened reliance on the political processes to relieve the stress on the 
social fabric while, at the same time, avoiding a "chilling effect" on the 
substance of dissent, may be an important public policy goal for the 
courts. The next question is what effect limiting the scope of appellate 
review would have on a given situation. 
VIL ANALYSIS OF VJITITOW IN LIGHT OF THE MIXED QUESTION 
DOCTRINE 
Judge Martin's dissent in Vittitow, criticizing the majority for reaching 
the merits of the challenge to the ordinance,241 matches very neatly 
with the philosophy behind limiting the appellate scope of review. The 
interests of judicial economy and upholding the legitimacy of the district 
court would seemingly dictate allowing the full hearing or the consoli-
dated hearing called for in FRCP 65(a)(2). At the very least, the 
majority could have remanded the case back to the district court for 
resolution under Madsen. Arguably, the standards called for in Madsen 
are stricter than those used by courts previously and, thus, will provide 
a greater degree of protection if properly applied.242 Presumably, the 
district court would have heeded that additional guidance if the case had 
been remanded. But, Judge Martin put his finger on the bottom line in 
Vittitow: 
While the district court in this case may have had more evidence or more time 
to consider whether to issue the preliminary injunction than is usual, neither of 
these factors transforms the district court's findings or conclusions into final 
findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the merits of the plaintiffs' 
complaint. 243 
It may well be that the district court would have eventually reached 
much the same conclusion that the majority did. But, the decision 
precludes it from doing so. The ordinance, though similar to the 
Brookfield, Wisconsin ordinance challenged in Frisby, was not 
240. However, Congress connected the escalation of violence directed at abortion 
clinics to the change in tactics and the increased use of blockades. See H.R. CONF. REP. 
No. 488, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 724, 724. 
241. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65. 
242. See Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (N.J. 1994). The New Jersey Supreme 
Court changed an injunction after remand from the Supreme Court in the wake of 
Madsen, commenting that "as currently structured, the injunction does not satisfy the 
stricter standards ... announced in Madsen." Id. at 1264. 
243. Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, I 108 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(Martin, J., dissenting). 
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challenged facially, but based upon its enforcement.244 Although the 
majority in Frisby construed the ordinance in a most favorable light, it 
did concede that the outcome may well have changed if a different fact 
pattern had been before it.245 Vittitow could very well be that different 
fact pattern. Furthermore, the district court was also balancing the First 
Amendment rights of plaintiff against Dr. Robinson's right to privacy, 
finding at least a "significant 9overnment interest"
246 in protecting him 
while the case was resolved.24 
The majority pointed out that this case varied from Frisby because 
plaintiffs did not facially challenge the ordinance. Enforcement had 
taken place. The enforcement itself apparently triggered overturning the 
ordinance because it presented the open field to do so.248 The Su-
preme Court, by going to "extraordinary measures" to save the statute 
in Frisby, left the field open for further statutory interpretation.249 
Indeed, one could argue that it left matters umesolved enough that the 
Upper Arlington City Attorney's office, in its attempt to follow the case 
law, opened itself to criticism from the Sixth Circuit.250 
The ultimate question is whether the outcome would have varied if the 
Sixth Circuit had allowed the district court to complete its process. 
Given the apparent agreement of both the majority and dissent on the 
probable outcome of any further hearing at the district court level,251 
the prospects for plaintiffs' success in overturning the ordinance seemed 
quite good. But, remand to the district court would have allowed 
application of the Madsen standard to a complete record, as well as the 
244. Id. at I I 02. 
245. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (I 987). 
246. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2518, 2525 (1994). 
247. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at I 102-03 & n.4. 
248. Id. at I I 06 ("[H]ere, the court was faced with a videotape and testimony 
demonstrating how the City did enforce the ordinance. The record made in the district 
court indicates the City was enforcing this ordinance in a manner contrary to the 
teaching of Madsen."). 
249. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483. See also Vittitow, 43 F.3d at I 106. 
250. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at I I 06. The Sixth Circuit was less charitable: "The City 
enacted this ordinance long after the decision in Frisby was issued and should have been 
well aware of the pitfalls in attempting to enforce an ordinance worded this broadly." 
Id. 
251. See id. at I I 09 ("As to . . . the likelihood of success on the merits, the 
majority's opinion supports my view that we should affirm the district court. The 
majority has reached the merits of the central questions in this case ... and has decided 
that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits."). 
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opportunity for the parties to present further evidence and argument, not 
merely the truncated record available to the appellate court. 
A. A Paradigm For Limited Scope of Review 
Because of the short time since Madsen, none of the injunction cases 
currently before the appeals courts have been decided at the district court 
level under the new standard of review. Yet, some possible patterns of 
review may be developing that courts may use in determining what 
scope of appellate review should be applied. The first issue is whether 
to restrict application of a "clearly erroneous" or "abuse of discretion" 
standard to federal causes of action. Implementation of FACE seeming-
ly guarantees access to the federal courts for clinics claiming damage 
from vociferous, even violent, protest, and for individuals who have been 
injured, intimidated, or interfered with by protesters.252 Pro-life groups 
have challenged FACE's constitutionality in district court. However, 
they have been largely unsuccessful to date.253 It would appear that 
any future challenge will face an uphill battle. 
The second issue likely to be litigated is whether a particular 
injunction or ordinance is content-neutral or not. If a court finds a 
particular injunction to be content or viewpoint based, a strict scrutiny 
standard of review applies, almost certainly dooming it. If it is content-
neutral, then the Madsen standard applies. In the wake of Madsen, 
federal appellate courts have applied the Madsen standard in a consistent 
manner, paying close attention to the criteria laid down in the case.254 
That trend indicates the settled state of the law on that point. Only the 
252. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West 1994). Section 248(a)(l) speaks to individuals who 
obtain or provide reproductive health services; § 248(a)(3) to clinics damaged by protest; 
§ 248(c)(l)(A) grants a right of action for civil remedy. Id. 
253. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995) (a three-
judge panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of FACE on the basis that 
the Act was within the scope of Congress's commerce power; it did not violate the First 
Amendment's Free Speech Clause; it was not overbroad or vague; and the Act's 
liquidated damages clause did not violate the First Amendment); but see United States 
v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995) (federal 
district court's holding the Act unconstitutional as an improper use of Congress's 
commerce power overturned on appeal). 
254. See, e.g., Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. I 995); Pro-
Choice Network of Western New York v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1995); 
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318, 1326-27 (D. Minn. 1995). The majority 
in Vittitow also applied the Madsen rule consistently, however prematurely. See supra 
text accompanying note 243. So has the one state supreme court to rule on the matter. 
See Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (N.J. 1994). 
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advent of new and different fact patterns that do not yield to a Madsen 
analysis will change that trend.25 
Furthermore, the types of government interests that the courts will find 
significant also seem settled at this juncture. Vittitow and Madsen echo 
the Frisby languaf.e in discussion of residential privacy and an analogous 
medical privacy.2 6 The more interesting question in each of the cases 
discussed supra has been whether the particular provisions of an 
ordinance or injunction in question burdens "no more speech than 
necessary to serve a significant government interest" in light of a given 
record.257 
In Madsen, the majority failed to uphold the buffer at the sides and 
rear of the clinic property because "nothing in the record indicates that 
petitioners' activities on the private property have obstructed access to 
the clinic."258 The Murray v. Lawson court also commented on the 
"sparse findings of the state court in Madsen" in granting the 300-foot 
buffer.259 One of Justice Scalia's major complaints was about the lack 
of showing of violence and other proscribable activity around the 
Madsen clinic.260 The Sixth Circuit likewise cited the lack of support 
in the record for proper enforcement in overturning the ordinance in 
question, protestations of the city attorney's office not withstanding.261 
Each of these instances, as well as the more detailed analysis of the 
cases supra, points towards a quintessential mixed question. Each case, 
and, perforce, each record in each trial is unique. Every clinic and every 
protest are differently situated. But, when viewed in light of Lee's 
analysis concerning how the Supreme Court viewed various fact 
finders,262 trial courts may discern a fairly clear message for the future: 
ensure that the record in any particular case errs on the side of being 
255. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994). 
256. Id. at 2526. See also Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1105. 
257. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526. 
258. Id. at 2528. 
259. 649 A.2d 1253, 1264 (N.J. 1994). 
260. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that 
"[a]nyone seriously interested in what this case was about must view that [video)tape. 
And anyone who is familiar with run-of-the-mine labor picketing, not to mention some 
other social protests, will be aghast at what it shows we have today permitted an 
individual judge to do."). 
261. Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, I 106-07 (6th Cir. 1995). 
262. See Lee, supra note 15, at 281-84. See also supra text accompanying notes 
56-85. 
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fully developed and able to support very narrow tailoring and be specific 
and unambiguous about the exact contours of an injunction.263 If trial 
courts exercise their discretion carefully over a period of time, then 
appellate courts may become more comfortable with limiting the scope 
of review even in this sensitive, First Amendment area. Protesters will 
then see more prompt and certain (and more enlightened, in view of 
Vittitow) enforcement of injunctions and ordinances. Tensions around 
the clinics themselves may decrease along with the unwanted violence. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This society is not likely to soon resolve the divisive question of 
abortion and all of the competing rights that it encompasses. The rising 
tide of violence bears testimony to the increasing rancor in the debate. 
But, as Rawls so eloquently points out, we, the members of a reasonably 
just society, bear a duty of civility. We also cannot condone violence. 
As a society, we must search for ways to defuse the tensions and anger 
that lead to violence while not infringing upon the precious, First 
Amendment right to protest. The judiciary, at all levels, stands at the 
center of this fine balancing act. 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Frisby and Madsen provide a 
framework for the courts to tailor injunctions along the limits of First 
Amendment protection of the right to protest. Ensuring that protest 
remains within these limits could do much to defuse the currently rising 
tide of violence. Pro-life advocates might even turn to other, seemingly 
more effective tactics to effect the changes in the law they desire so 
much. But, endless and multiple appeals have blunted prompt and 
certain enforcement of the injunctions and ordinances, robbing them of 
much of their efficacy. Clearly, this was necessary while Congress and 
the courts developed the law necessary to cope with the problems. That 
framework would now appear largely in place. 
Application of the Madsen and Frisby principles by the trial courts is 
the quintessential mixed question.264 The appellate courts have shown 
discomfort in allowing a narrow scope of review in many areas of 
constitutional law, but have allowed considerable discretion in others. 
263. For a good example of this, see Murray, 649 A.2d at 1265 (the trial judge 
knew the street where the residence in question was located because he had paid a visit 
to the location). 
264. The recent Second Circuit decision in Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 
377 (1995), upholding, inter alia, a floating fifteen foot buffer zone would seem to 
highlight this point. As this casenote was going to press, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to this case. It will be interesting to see on what basis it reviews the case. 
Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996). 
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But, if the trial courts are careful in their application of the case law and 
develop their records fully to support their findings, then the appellate 
courts may allow them to exercise their discretion by promptly 
upholding their findings. This will allow more prompt enforcement and 
a concomitant decrease in the level of tension and violence surrounding 
the clinics. 
ROGER HIGGINS 
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